Sweet Jeebus, mortage servicers had PASSWORD CONTROLLED ACCESS TO BORROWER PAYMENT RECORDS, and altered them?
OMG! Just when I think, "Finally, I've been cynical enough!" something even more appalling scuttles out from under a new rock! Here's a great summary of the state of play on foreclosure fraud at Yves's place; this is I thought was the nut graf:
LPS’s [Lender Processing Services] reach is wide. 14 of the 15 biggest loan servicers are its clients and every one of the 50 biggest banks use some of its services [for mortgage and foreclosure procssing]. ...
The City of St. Clair Shores Employees’ Retirement System is the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against Lender LPS that was amended and expanded yesterday. The suit is against the company and its three top officers, char[g]ing them with violations of Federal securities laws with the intent of inflating the company’s revenues and stock price.
The filing relies heavily on affidavits by 17 confidential witnesses, all former LPS employees, some of them supervisory level. It is thus able to allege that bad practices were widespread and clearly designed and driven by top management.
Yes, control fraud, organized and carried out by thieves and looters at the executive level (sorry for the redundancy). In other words, yes, we need to see bankster CEOs in orange jumpsuits doing the perp walk.
But read on! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG! ZOMG!
But the new and more troubling material is the mess LPS has made of bank records. LPS employees were given password controlled access to borrower payment records and could and did alter those accounts. These passwords were routinely and widely shared, in contravention of good practice. And since everything at LPS was organized around maximizing throughput rather than doing anything correctly, the errors were widespread:
LPS employees were rewarded for their speed, and this resulted in the violation of security protocols and significant and pervasive errors in the default services that they were providing (e.g., the application of mortgage payments to incorrect accounts). ....
Now consider the question of the integrity of borrower records. Because LPS was so casual about password control, a large number of employees could and did:
….access mortgage records of borrowers and alter them by changing entries, reversing transactions, adding transactions, and moving funds in and out of suspense accounts.
And the company was not terribly concerned about accuracy:
There was a huge volume of ledgers that had to be created and problems in loan files that had to be researched and unraveled by CW [Confidential Witness] 16 and his colleagues. These problems included, among others, missing payments, misapplied payments from other loan files, and payments that should have been attributed to other loans…
... According to CW16 “a lot of people didn’t understand the financial side and just winged it.”
Ya know, I can screw up my account all on own without any help from the banksters. But if I were rewarded for my speed, I bet I could screw it up even faster!