Foreclosure fraud: Lack of agency at Izvestia
Doesn't Izvestia have editors who can catch this sort of thing? Note the lack of agency throughout this story, from the leading paragraphs all the way to the end. Note also, in each case, the effects. Starting with the lead:
Millions of homeowners in distress are getting [Will the story explain why? You'd think...] some unexpected breathing room — lots of it in some places. ... [New foreclosure cases and repossessions are down nationally by about a third since last fall, LPS said. In New York, foreclosure filings are down 85 percent since September, according to the New York State Unified Court System].
[T]he foreclosure system is bogged down by the volume of cases, borrowers are fighting to keep their houses and many lenders seem to be in no hurry to add repossessed houses to their books.
Why would the lenders be reluctant, one might wonder? Could it be that CEOs have decided that letting people who fight keep their homes is a lesser evil than going to jail for accounting control fraud?
When major banks acknowledged last fall that they had been illegally [kudos] processing foreclosures by filing false court documents [the word for that is "fraud"], they said that any pause in repossessions and evictions would be brief. All of the major servicers agreed to institute reforms in their foreclosure procedures. In April, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and other regulators gave the banks 60 days to draw up a plan to do so.
But nothing is happening quickly. When the comptroller’s deadline was reached last week, it was extended [By whom and why?] another month.
So, could it be that the banks haven't "reformed" their procedures because their procedures can't be reformed? After all, they'd surely fake it if they could. Could it be that it's fraud all the way down? (After all, the system that feeds the data into their procedures is MERS -- oddly, or not, unmentioned in the narrative -- and MERS not only handles about half the mortgages in the country, it's potentially screwed up the chain of title on everything it touched, according to any investigator not a servicer or bankster shill.)
The large number of cases nationally — about two million, plus another two million waiting in the wings — have overwhelmed many lenders and the courts.
If it were just a numbers game, FL's "rocket docket" didn't work. It didn't, so something else is in play: I'd say fraud.
Lenders, who service loans they own as well as those owned by investors, tried to circumvent the time-intensive process [of foreclosure] by using “robo-signers” who mass-produced documents, many of which made inaccurate claims [we call those "frauds on the court," and the lawyers who do it should be disbarred]. When the bad practices [note the retreat from "illegal"] were discovered [by whom?] last fall, the lenders were forced [by whom?] to revisit hundreds of thousands of cases.
Anyhow, RL calls and I can't disentangle the rest. Not the best post ever! But notice what's not covered:
2. The anti-foreclosure movement ("Produce the note!")
3. Accounting control fraud. I'd say the "tell" is in the bankster's behavior. The foreclosure process is so riddled with fraud that it cannot be reformed; indeed, it's so bad that they aren't even trying to fake a reform. And so it looks like the bankster CEOs are going to hang onto their ill-gotten gains, keep their heads down to avoid criminal charges of fraud, and "look forward and not back."
NOTE Yves has better analysis, but doesn't have "lack of agency" in the toolkit on this one.